THE NEW REPUBLIC

Nuclear Pacifism

Bertrand Russell *Robert W. Tucker*

More Money, More Learning?

Leo J. Hertzel

Hurrying Slowly Forward

The Editors

Neutralism in Korea

Yeung Hi Lee

March 6, 1956

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T.R.B. from Washington

What Should Kennedy Do?

★ Why doesn't Kennedy move faster? Why are his requests so modest? We get so many questions like that it seems time for a background briefing. Kennedy's big antagonist is Congress. Basically it is a conservative institution. The seniority system, rules of procedure, rural domination of state legislatures, one-party control in the South – they all make Congress more conservative than the nation itself. (Learned books describe every one of these points; in this capsule you must take our word for it.)

Present Democratic majorities in Congress mean next to nothing for Kennedy. The key fact is that the conservative GOP-Dixiecrat coalition is virtually a separate party. It has more cohesion than either of the two old parties. The real House line-up is 195-205 liberal Kennedy Democrats *vs* 190-200 conservative coalitionists. About 5 percent of the membership is absent on any rollcall; 20 to 40 remaining members switch from side to side.

Now consider these other facts: Over 80 Southern Democrats of Senate and House come from one-party areas that lack even token GOP opposition; they don't have to think nationally. The average Southern Democrat votes with his party about half the time; some Democratic committee chairmen like Byrd of Virginia vote with their party only a third of the time. Yet when a liberal urban Democrat like Clark of Pennsylvania chides Byrd he feels the whip – he fails to get the committee post he wants (Foreign Relations), though others get it with less seniority.

The final point is that Kennedy won by a hairline nationally while 21 House Democrats, mostly liberals from big urban areas, were defeated. This is the handicap Kennedy is up against. It is a crazy – it is a dangerous system, but that isn't the point. The problem is, what should Kennedy do?

A Waiting Game

★ It would be easy to set lance at the conservatives and go down to glorious defeat. That isn't like Kennedy at all. He is the man who put Lyndon Johnson on his ticket. He is not a romantic. Maybe it would be better if he were more romantic; there comes a point where being cold-blooded becomes cynicism. But Kennedy, we think, isn't cynical – he is playing a waiting game. He is appealing over the head of Congress to the public, using every publicity means available. He is not appealing so much for particular bills as trying to create confidence in himself.

Are the bills he is sending to Congress satisfactory? The frank answer of a liberal is "No." They are compromises, or compromises of compromises. Last year's bills are cut down. Kennedy's own task force on schools urged $1.460 billion a year; he asks only $766 million. There is no civil rights bill. The economic program is a sugar pill (which demonstrates uncomfortably the power of auto-suggestion on the recklessly inflated stock market).

On the other hand these bills are all in the right direction. They are getting up momentum. They may even be passed. Congress is making up its mind. If Congress were on the *Titanic* and the order came – "Abandon ship!" – Congress would take a week out for Lincoln Day speeches, another for Jackson Day and 10 days for Easter. Then it would look for the lifeboats.

What strikes us in all this is the extreme susceptibility of Congress right now. At few times would a letter to a Congressman have more influence. The pattern hasn't hardened, it is all malleable. If you want to take part in history instead of just reading it, this is the time. You have to do two things to write a letter. Find the name of your Congressman. Tell him to get humping.

Grippe Plus Anemia

★ Writing for the Japanese business magazine *Nihon Keizai*, MIT economist Paul Samuelson, who headed the Kennedy pre-inaugural economic task force, says that "according to my crude calculations, President Kennedy's measures are about in line with the recommendations made on January 5 by my own economic report to him." But the public should have "no illusions" about the long-range situation. "Even if the American economy begins to turn up by the middle of 1961," he says, "there is little reason to think that the end of the year will find us with unemployment much better than at the present time."

Few laymen yet understand this thinking. What it means is that the American economic patient shows two ailments – an attack of grippe (the temporary recession) and – much worse – signs of pernicious anemia (a retarded annual growth rate). Diagnostically the two may be connected. As to economic growth Germany, France, Italy, Japan – let alone the Soviet Union – all are bounding ahead faster than we, and until America fills this "economic gap" there won't be jobs enough for the expanding work force nor money to balance the budget.

There is a school of economic thought that feels the public is too dumb to be told bad news. Kennedy "may talk the country into a depression," warns Senator Dirksen, and his colleague Goldwater, the Republican nature god, shares the view. We were pleased that sprightly columnist Sylvia Porter called this approach "an insult to your intelligence." An instance of it appeared recently in the steel industry. It used to get out valuable weekly statistics of percentage of steel capacity which mills were operating. This fell to a discouraging 50 percent. Finally the industry decided to drop the figures. "But," as Samuelson notes, "changing the method of reporting has not, to this date, created jobs for a single man or served to raise profits in the industry by a single dollar."

Repent

★ Juvenile court Judge Cundiff sentenced Mandeline Thompson, 16, colored, to 30 days in jail last week for remaining "unrepentant" after participating in a sit-in drugstore demonstration at Lynchburg, Va. Lacking contrition, he ruled, the teenager must be treated as an adult.

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Hurrying Slowly Forward

THE WEEK

3. Hurrying Slowly Forward; Prep School Equality; Treaty with Canada; Foreign Competition; Reischauer to Japan; Williams on Safari

ARTICLES

7. Deadlock over Northern Rhodesia by Denis Healey
8. "The Tragedy of Territorial Division" by Yeung Hi Lee
10. More Money, More Learning? by Leo J. Hertzel
13. The Debate on Nuclear Pacifism by Bertrand Russell and Robert W. Tucker

DEPARTMENTS

17. Books 20. Movies 21. Theater 22. Correspondence

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As TRB reports this week, there are some admirers of the President who have begun to worry that he is too backward about moving forward. They fear Mr. Kennedy retreats too early, compromises too soon, asks for too little. Misgivings of this sort take far too little account of the President's personal understanding of how far we have lagged and how much needs doing, and too little account of the enormity of the opposition he must overcome merely to persuade the Congress to do what should have been done a decade ago. It is still insufficiently appreciated, abroad and here, that John Kennedy assumed leadership of a country that was not and is not aware that it lacked leadership. He is expected to awaken a people that has not believed it was asleep. He is expected not only to provide answers, but to persuade us of the importance of the questions. He is not permitted for one instant to forget to pay wary respect to his slender margins: the margin of his election, the margin with which the struggle was won in the House Rules Committee, and most important, the margin which knowledgeable Congressional arithmetic indicates is all that is available to him no matter how moderate his requests may be. To succeed on the big things, he must first succeed on the smaller ones. And insofar as he succeeds on the small things, he builds for himself a stronger position from which he may then ask for more.

There is an identifiable style in this operation. Practically everything on the 16-item "must list" on which Speaker Rayburn is now setting to work was sent to Capitol Hill for immediate passage, but with the reminder that it might not be enough, and that the President might return with later requests. Thus, in January, Mr. Kennedy said that he would take a second look at the economy in April and after that second look he would decide whether more drastic action – such as a tax cut – is advisable, over and above the stimulants that have already been given. A preview of that second look may be expected at the precedent-breaking appearance of the President's Council of Economic Advisers before the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, scheduled for March 6. The classroom before which these academic counselors of the President will present their views is not confined to a room in Washington. Their audience is the entire country.

During the Eisenhower Administration, the successive heads of the Council of Economic Advisers, Messrs. Burns and Saulnier, insisted on being heard in executive session, with revised and condensed versions of their remarks published only subsequently. But that procedure

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"Take It Easy, Son – He's Barely Broke"

does not serve Mr. Kennedy's purpose, for the CEA like every other executive instrument must help the President widen his channels of communication to the public, thereby widening the peoples' knowledge of their affairs and thus their willingness to consent to both immediate remedies and longer-term cures. On March 6, therefore, the CEA will testify in open session. Moreover, three Council members, and not merely the Chairman, will appear.

The picture they give of the economy may prove to be a bit brighter than might have been anticipated in early January. The bullishness of the stock market, the slight improvement in the utilization rate of steel capacity have roused expectations that once the effect of three months of execrable weather are behind us, the recession will have begun to recede. And in his testimony last week before a subcommittee of the House Labor Committee, Secretary of Labor Goldberg, while noting that unemployment last month was higher than it had been in any January since World War II, did detect one or two signs that "provide a little more hopeful note."

But the Congress will be ill-advised if it assumes one swallow assures the summer. Neither Secretary Goldberg nor any other Administration official is under the illusion that America is about to zoom along that high road of full use of manpower, skills and resources. An economy can hardly be described as about to zoom with more than half the country's 150 major economic areas listed as having at least six percent of their work force unemployed, with numerous pockets at levels of distress high above this average, with perhaps 14 percent of Negro workers jobless, and with cities like Washington, D. C., reopening their United Givers Funds to meet relief needs unanticipated last October. The pace of recovery will not be rapid, and with 1.2 million new entrants coming into the labor force as the war babies finish school this June, next year's economic trends may be no more heartening than those of this January. The President and his advisors know this. But their knowing it is of little avail unless and until the public and its legislative representatives know it too.

Prep School Equality

From Andover comes word that one prep school Academy has not waited for the federal action urged in these pages one month ago to provide one or more national boarding schools open to everyone regardless of income. Andover has reached the enviable position of having enough endowment to guarantee a subsidy to any student who qualifies for admission. Negroes, Jews and others considered "undesirable" by some of the more exclusive prep schools will get the same treatment from Andover as everyone else. (Considering the condition of elementary education for Southern Negroes, however, the opportunity to "compete on equal terms" with graduates of Westchester private schools may not have an especially egalitarian effect.)

The extraordinary thing about Andover's position is that it should be unique. No other residential school or college in the country seems to offer such equality of opportunity. Yet Andover's scheme is not impossibly expensive for a well-endowed institution. All it requires is redistribution of student subsidies.

The total cost of educating an Andover student is about $12,000, or about $3,000 a year. Until recently about half of this expense was carried by the endowment fund. For a few talented students, further subsidies were available as special scholarships. But the great majority had to pay their share of $1,500 a year, or go somewhere else. After some soul-searching the Board of Trustees decided this was a foolish arrangement. They felt it would be wiser to stop subsidizing the rich, who could often afford to pay the full cost of their children's education, and concentrate on subsidizing the poor, who could not. By reducing the automatic subsidy from $1,500 per year to $800, the school is now raising enough additional money from prosperous parents to provide the less prosperous with as large a subsidy as they need. Although carrying this process

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to its logical conclusion will take time, one can look forward to the year when rich parents will pay the full cost of $3,000, and the endowment will be used only for those who cannot do without it.

The promise of equal opportunity is not, of course, without certain dangers. When the best-known fact about a school is that it charges $1,500 a year, most young people never even consider applying. The very mention of such a sum scares them so that they forget the possibility of scholarships. Even those who are dimly aware of such philanthropy tend to assume that such stipends are only for budding Einsteins, and precious few of our self-effacing younger generation think of themselves in these terms.

But suppose that some Madison Avenue miracle now enables Andover to publicize its newly-acquired equality of opportunity for bright adolescents all over the country. If everyone who finds his high school stultifying also reads that "Andover is a residential school for gifted students and teachers, whose charges are fixed after consultation with parents, in the light of individual family budgets," then won't the school be deluged with applications from the "wrong side of the tracks"? If the school persists in choosing its students on the basis of intellectual promise rather than ability to pay, won't the endowment eventually be badly strained? And if sociologists are right in claiming that bright working-class and lower middle-class boys tend to enter salaried professions like teaching and engineering, won't alumni contributions to endowment funds grow steadily more meager as the years pass?

Fortunately such problems are as yet imaginary. Working-class boys show no signs of hearing about Andover, much less applying for scholarships. The present beneficiaries of scholarship subsidies often seem to go into the better-paid professions and business, and while they probably don't make as much money as their classmates who started well-heeled, they may well bequeath more of what they have to alma mater.

Treaty with Canada

The signing of a diplomatic treaty between Canada and the United States last January 17 by former President Eisenhower and Premier John Diefenbaker of Canada was a significant milestone in more than a decade of negotiation over the joint development of the power-potential of the Columbia River Basin. About 15 percent of this drainage area is located in Canada, and the rest in the US. The power-potential, according to the best engineering estimates, represents about one-twelfth the total power potential of all the rivers in the world! This diplomatic solution to a long-standing international dispute, however, now needs the ratification of the Canadian Parliament (which is almost certain) and the Senate of the United States. Senate hearings will open on March 8.

The treaty itself requires Canada to build three dams, at High Arrow, Duncan Lake and Mica Creek, for the storage of about 15.5 million acre-feet of water within a 10-year period at a cost of about $400 million. The US also has the option of building a dam at a cost of about $325 million at Libby in Montana. This country has everything to gain and little to lose by the agreement. For one thing, we need the power much more urgently than do the Canadians. For another, the Canadians have other alternative diversions of the Columbia River in mind, less to our advantage, which the treaty forbids for 60 years. Our Pacific Northwest stands favorably to get twice the storage for less than one-half the cost, and extra power generated from the storage. Failure of the US Senate to ratify the treaty would greatly strain Canadian-American relations and be interpreted in the north as a breach of faith. The assurance of Sen. Mike Mansfield (the Montana member of the Senate's powerful Foreign Relations Committee) that the treaty will receive a friendly Senate reception augurs well for a continuance of traditional Canadian-American cordiality.

Foreign Competition

The release of a summary of a report prepared by the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reintroduces the concept of "Adjustment-Assistance" into deliberations over economic policy in Washington. Adjustment-Assistance would be federal financial aid to industries which can prove that they cannot hold out against foreign competition, not because of inefficiency but because of relative advantages of the competitor in the other country (*e.g.*, cheaper labor). Such industries would obtain government loans allowing them to modernize their plants or shift their lines of products. Whether an industry can demonstrate to the satisfaction of any impartial observer that the source of its trouble is not inefficiency is a moot one, and the plan runs the risk of becoming similar to agricultural price supports for unprofitable production. The merit of Adjustment-Assistance may be largely political – cushioning the shock to some industries under the pressure of free international competition. The likelihood of a Congressional relapse into a self-defeating protectionism might be averted. In short, as long as the support takes the form of bona-fide loans, is limited in scope, terminates automatically after a period of time and wards off higher tariffs, it is useful.

Adjustment-Assistance was a major instrument of the European Coal and Steel Community when it reduced tariffs among the six European countries; it was

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also helpful in reducing the resistance of Belgian coal miners and French steel mills to the plan.

But what is needed even more than Adjustment-Assistance to management, is similar help to labor. Automation, other technological innovations, and the high speed of general change in the modern economy, make constant demands on laborers to move from one occupation to another. Farmers and their sons have to become factory-hands; some of the production workers have to become service-employees; coal miners have to seek new occupations. The shift, especially when it involves older persons, is often painful and expensive. It frequently requires a period of unemployment, change of residence and retraining. Other countries have long recognized that it is in the interest of the economy to subsidize retraining in order to reduce unemployment in one area while there is a lack of labor force in others.

Such subsidies often pay off in another way: retraining programs reduce worker resistance to technological innovations and to reorganization of the work process. Thus, if the "third" pilots who seem to become superfluous in the jet era are assured of government assistance for retraining and compensation for losses suffered by a change of residence, they might take this way out, thereby reducing pressure for the maintenance of artificial employment. The same holds for firemen in diesel locomotives, for musicians who "stand by" for recorded programs, as well as for the larger groups of workers in areas where employment is declining, as on farms, in coal mines and steel mills.

Reischauer to Japan

Writing on "The Broken Dialogue with Japan" in *Foreign Affairs* following the Tokyo riots of 1960, Edwin O. Reischauer found it "natural that our Embassy should have more contact with English-speaking businessmen and with conservative political leaders, who not only stand in the positions of responsibility but also share more of our point of view on world problems." But, added Professor Reischauer (who speaks Japanese and is as familiar with Japanese culture and history as anyone he may meet in Tokyo), "we should know enough about Japan to realize that a great gulf in thinking lies between these people and the intellectuals and others of the opposition. The latter are right in their charge that the close contacts they once had with Americans during the occupation no longer exist." And the US should know, too, that the sympathies of "the bulk of Japan's intellectuals and college students" – whose ascendancy in Japanese politics "at some future date seems not just possible but probable" – were on the side of the rioters.

This was not an analysis likely to please the ingroup, the businessmen and conservative political leaders who came to feel during the regime of Ambassador Douglas MacArthur that the US Embassy is their private preserve. When the name of Reischauer as Ambassador was sent to Tokyo one month ago for *agrément* there were some frowns in the Foreign Office followed by inspired rumors that the appointment would not be acceptable (the press, however, received the news warmly).

Finally, there were whispers that Professor Reischauer's Japanese wife would be a liability rather than an asset: she would give Embassy entree to Japan's intellectuals, perhaps liberals (she is related to Saburo Matsukata, a nobly-born intellectual who resigned as General Manager of the Kyodo News Agency in 1959 under the pressure of business leaders who thought him too independent). Mr. Reischauer's appointment appears to be going through, and Mr. Kennedy is to be congratulated for his courteous but determined refusal to be pushed about by a small cocktail set in Tokyo.

Williams on Safari

If we Americans analyzed our own diplomatic reactions in the same awed way we interpret those of the Soviet Union, we could probably ascribe Mennen Williams' brush with the British press this past week to a deliberate master plan on the part of the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to present a new image of the United States to Africa. In fact, Williams simply bumbled into this hornets' nest in East Africa because he lacked sufficient background to anticipate the implications of his visit on the very eve of Kenya's first general elections. Nevertheless, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has now established himself as a vivid personality in every capital in Africa, and has won a roaring vote of approval from the political leaders he most wants to influence in the months ahead – the black ones.

There is a long way to go on this journey, however, and a tangle of political complexities for Mr. Williams to sort out as he threads his way through those parts of Africa where the Africans already have power. It is unsettling to note that he undertook so delicate a mission with an entourage lacking in a senior support officer thoroughly versed in African affairs. As was noted in these columns at the time of Williams' appointment, he is uniquely qualified by personality and political training to deal with ebullient Africans. But his diplomatic success will depend on strong staffing at a high and very personal level. At the very least there should have been one person in his official party who could have known that Tanganyika does not have a Governor General!

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Deadlock Over Northern Rhodesia

London

In Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, the hitherto irresistible force represented by Britain's Colonial Secretary, Iain MacLeod, seems to have met an immovable object. Recently, the five members of the governing executive council of Northern Rhodesia from the Welensky United Federal Party, which represents the bulk of the white settlers there, resigned in protest over the MacLeod plan to give Africans a greater political voice. And Sir Roy, summoning an emergency session of the Federal Parliament, took the defiant step of calling up 5,000 territorial troops in a show of force. These are ominous developments that touch the interests and emotions of not simply the British Government or the white settlers or all of Black Africa. As in the Congo, the entire world is a participant in the drama.

It is just over a year since Harold Macmillan made his famous speech about the need to recognize the wind of change in Africa. Since then the Monckton Commission has reported that there is no chance of the Central African Federation surviving unless the Africans rapidly achieve a majority in the legislative assemblies of at least two of its three components, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Since these two territories are still British colonies, the government in London has both the power and the responsibility for seeing that this condition is met. Last summer it pushed through changes in Nyasaland which for the time being have satisfied the minimum aspirations of the Africans. Its aim now is to do the same for Northern Rhodesia. The new Constitution proposed by London would relax property, income and educational qualifications for voting to increase the number of Africans enfranchised tenfold – to a total of about 70,000 (the number of Africans in Northern Rhodesia is about 2,250,000 as against 72,000 whites).

But though the overwhelming majority of Northern Rhodesians are African, the white minority is nonetheless nine times larger than in Nyasaland. Moreover Northern Rhodesia, like neighboring Katanga in the Congo, has vast mineral deposits which are being worked by white-owned companies. Finally the addition of an African majority government in Northern Rhodesia would mean African majority government in the Federation as a whole. So it is not surprising that the white settlers feel that they must stand firm now.

The problem is complicated because Welensky's party, the United Federal Party, is under heavy pressure from more extreme groups among the white settlers, and it exists in Southern Rhodesia as well as Northern Rhodesia. Thus its adamant stand is powerfully grounded in local party politics, and is resented doubly by the Africans and liberal whites because it appears as intervention by Southern Rhodesia in the internal affairs of Northern Rhodesia.

It is a difficult, indeed a dangerous situation. The cards are all in MacLeod's hands, and if he weakens now he will ruin any chance of progress not only in the Federation, but in the rest of British Africa as well. But at the same time, Welensky may as a last resort consider supporting the secession of Southern Rhodesia from the Federation. It would be an ironic choice for a man whose basic principle till now has been to oppose the right of any territory to secede. Nevertheless, as many opponents of the federal setup have argued, the Federation cannot survive without African support, and that can only be won by measures unacceptable to the whites in Southern Rhodesia, who are not subject to British control in their own territory.

It is not easy to see how Southern Rhodesia would develop if it left the Federation and tried to survive as an independent state. Some of its white supremacists would like to join up in some way with South Africa. But the bulk of the white settlers are of British origin and are well aware that the Afrikaners who now run South Africa are only a little less hostile to the British than to the colored peoples.

In its moral, economic and political aspects the Central African situation has much in common with that in Algeria. But there are two enormous differences which would rob the British Government of any excuse for the sort of weakness and indecision shown by so many French Governments in Algeria. In the first place, the number of white settlers is very much smaller than in Algeria, and is also a much smaller proportion of the total colored population. In the second place, the British army is not directly involved in any way at present, and is universally anxious to remain uninvolved.

Thus the British Government can take its decision free from most of the political pressures and physical fears which have paralyzed French policy in Algeria for so many years.

DENIS HEALEY

DENIS HEALEY is a Member of Parliament and a leading foreign policy spokesman of the British Labour Party.

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A KOREAN REPORTS ON THE RISE OF NEUTRALISM

"The Tragedy of Territorial Division"

Seoul

Since the student revolt last April South Koreans have been uneasily reassessing their place in world affairs. It is a paradox that while, on the one hand, Koreans know they have the Americans to thank in good part for the ouster of Syngman Rhee, this very fact has helped to drive home the reality of Korean dependence on the United States (nearly 60 percent of the national budget comes from Washington).

Complaints against foreign influence had been smouldering under the Rhee regime, but had never been allowed to enter public discussion until the present moment. Now the new wave of nationalism has become a subject of open talk among intellectuals and even in the press. The success of the revolution greatly enhanced the self-respect – and self-assertiveness – of the students and intellectuals who will govern Korea tomorrow even if not today.

The government and people have become increasingly sensitive to the slightest suggestion of interference with Korean internal affairs. Thus the government has officially expressed its desire for a reappraisal of the existing pattern of operation of US assistance programs, contending that it has taken more than its fair share of the blame for the often-criticized inefficiency and misuse of the vast amount of American aid. It has also demanded a "status of forces" agreement governing US military personnel in the country. Charges have been aired in the Assembly that the US holds what amounts to a right of veto on government expenditures.

One of the most explosive recent episodes of nationalist resentment centered around a highly-placed Pentagon General, directly in charge of the military assistance program, who offered some "friendly advice" during a recent visit to Korea. His opposition to a projected housecleaning in the corruption-riddled Korean military community led the Korean Army Chief of Staff, newly appointed after the revolution, to warn that "we must be alert to guard the national sovereignty against infringements." Not a single time before during the 12 years of the US presence in Seoul had a Korean General dared to speak out in this manner, and it is noteworthy that the whole nation seemed to stand firm behind him.

All Korean newspapers recognized the good intentions of the Pentagon General but were unanimous in emphasizing the distinction between advice and interference. (Operational and logistic control of the Korean Army is in the hands of the Commanding General of the US Eighth Army, who is concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea, though personnel policy within the Korean Army has been exercised independently.)

There was a time – under Rhee – when police terrorism freed the government from the necessity to listen to public opinion. But now the government must both listen and react. The action of the government in calling for a "status of forces" agreement was a direct consequence of an unprecedented petition campaign.

Let me stress here that the new wave of nationalism is not essentially anti-American in character. It is rather the expression of the national aspiration for a higher degree of independence and equality in relations with the United States. The goodwill of the United States, shown in its assistance for the Korean independence movement, its defense of Korean freedom against Communism, and its economic aid since the Korean War, has planted the image of the United States as a true friend. At the same time, the United States will have to expect an increasingly restive Korean attitude.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new nationalism is the movement toward neutralism as a possible means of unifying the divided Korean territory. Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations for and against the new-born idea are now daily events – in the streets and in serious private discussion among students, professors, politicians and public opinion leaders. No poll has been taken to measure the support for this new trend of thought. Yet public debate and demonstrations, press sentiment, and the impression one gets from individual conversations provide a fairly reasonable basis for judgment. Neutralism is clearly supported by a large segment of students and a considerable proportion of young intellectuals. There is a clear gulf between the younger generation and the present leadership in both government and private life.

If it is premature to say at present that neutralism is the predominant view, it is at least a national mood. Attention should be given in the West to the new fact that the Koreans have come to question the wisdom of attaching themselves to one power camp of the Cold War – offering their territory as a possible theater of conflict once again.

The external factors contributing to this trend are in some respects typical of other countries – the shift

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of the power balance as between the United States and the USSR; the rapidly darkening shadow of an historically malignant and formidable neighbor, Communist China; the increasing prestige and consolidation of the neutralist world and its impressive economic development, and the growing strength of Japanese neutralism. In addition to this set of factors, Korean intellectuals doubt if America would and could take the same firm attitude in the case of any future invasion that she did in 1950. And they seriously fear, in spite of repeated US Government promises, the possibility of Korea being excluded from the worldwide US defense line as in one phase of the Truman period. The prospect of foreign policy changes in the Kennedy Administration has aroused a wave of speculation that the US is now prepared to tolerate Korean neutralization given an agreement of the concerned powers.

Moreover, the external factors have reinforced strong internal factors – notably the ethnic affinity between homogenous North and South Korea; the separation of millions of families across the 38th Parallel, and the impossibility of the economic survival of primarily agricultural South Korea unless it is united with predominantly industrial North Korea. The argument for a neutralized, united Korea comes down to the proposition that sound economic development can take place only by unifying the divided land – and to the hope that as a step toward economic progress, a compromise between the two different systems prevailing in north and south can be evolved through disengagement from the present power camps, accompanied by the agreement of the concerned powers to respect Korean neutrality. To South Koreans, neutralism itself is not the primary aim but rather is seen as a possible means of escaping from poverty. In this respect Korean neutralism differs from that of Japan, based mainly on fear of involvement in future war, or from that of Indonesia and India, which is, above anything else, a means of maintaining a flexible bargaining position and of improving their influence in the international political community, or from that of Yugoslavia, based as it is on ideology as well as national interest.

Serious defeatism has taken hold of the South Korean Government and people as a consequence of the tremendous economic development (especially the eye-opening degree of industrialization) achieved in Communist North Korea. The recent exodus of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea, the first such large-scale movement from the Western world to Communism, cannot be brushed aside as a minor Communist propaganda defeat.

General living conditions in South Korea have, of course, improved from the low point of wartime misery, but per capita income is still near $50. Some two billion dollars of US economic aid in various forms for the last 12 years has done little to improve the situation, as was suggested in part of the report prepared by Conlon Associates of San Francisco at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year.

Korean newspapers, which are extraordinarily influential in local opinion forming, do not hesitate of late to warn that the Korean economy is gradually becoming "semi-colonial." The failure of wise programming and efficient implementation on the part of aid authorities and the total corruption of the Rhee Government produced about two dozen *nouveaux riches* millionaires at the same time that unemployment was on a rapid increase; the number of jobless is now variously estimated at from 2.5 to 3 million out of a total national labor force of 8 million. The economic crisis strikes especially at the young intellectuals and students, whose future is, they fear not without reason, only to join the already appalling numbers of the educated unemployed. Educated in the Western tradition, yet not permitted a middle-class existence (there is, one might say, no middle class in Korea in the conventional sense), they are driven to the shadows of the society, radicalized, disaffected and articulate.

The government as the spokesman of all those who are against Korean neutrality reasons that a small state is safer allied with a great nation and that neither the United States nor Russia would honor permanent neutrality. It also asserts that political stability, a presupposition for neutrality in, let us say, the Austrian style, would be impossible. North Korean Communists with well-trained subversives would strangle South Korean democracy in a year or so, it is said, whatever their professions. To this the neutralist argument is that while democratic institutions are valued, so is economic progress, and that some "minor" liberties and rights may be expendable if this promises economic results.

The issue of neutralism is still in the embryo stage and it must be stressed that if the present Korean leadership can, with US help, present some visible hope for the future, South Koreans are quite ready to accept the national tragedy of territorial division – at least for some time, until the opportunity arrives for reunification – in order to assure the maintenance of Western-style democracy. But the strong underlying desire for national union will persist as a national force constantly seeking its release and full expression. The new generation has no personal recollection of Communist rule and of the physical terror experienced by the old. Therefore, given a continuance of the Cold War, an increasing number of the young Koreans gradually moving into positions of leadership in the society are likely to continue their efforts for unification – and unification through neutralism, if no better means can be found.

YEUNG HI LEE

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More Money, More Learning?

by Leo J. Hertzel

The President describes the goal of his $5.625 billion education program as "a new standard of excellence in education." Insofar as the program, if enacted, is administered with this objective in mind, it will deserve our enthusiastic support. It would seem that the provisions to increase teachers' salaries and provide funds for college scholarships will in general and in the long run contribute to higher standards. But whether federal funds for classroom construction (much as that is needed by our expanding school population) will actually help set a new standard of excellence depends on what goes on in those classrooms – and this must be decided primarily by each community.

The National Education Association estimates the total national cost for public elementary and secondary education in 1960-61 at $16.5 billion. In 1959-60, the figure was $15.3 billion, an increase of nine percent over the preceding year. In 1957, the last year for which complete figures are available, more than 40 percent of all tax money collected by American municipal governments went to finance local schools. Almost 30 percent of the total tax dollars collected by the individual states that year was spent on public education.

The results of this astonishingly large expenditure are visible. Cities, towns and counties in every state are spending annually huge sums for new classrooms, gymnasiums, playing fields and stadiums; for coaches, counselors, administrators and teachers; for the purchase of athletic equipment, buses and batons; for fuel and electricity and air conditioning and sometimes subsidized lunch programs. In a very real sense, American education enters the 1960's as a privileged enterprise. While the 1959 average salary of $5,400 paid classroom teachers may be considered inadequate, *The Municipal Yearbook for 1960* lists the mean average salary for superintendents of schools in communities over 500,000 as $26,536; the mean average salary for mayors of those same communities is $22,394. The mean average salary for superintendents of schools in communities of 100,000 to 250,000 population is $16,805; for city librarians, $8,840; for mayors, $12,733.

Little red schoolhouses have been replaced by functional, antiseptic brick and glass structures complete with swimming pools, two-way "intercom" systems linking classrooms and offices, elaborate audio-visual equipment, auditoriums, gymnasiums, three or four professionally-outfitted athletic teams, playing fields, a band, possibly an orchestra, and complete shop facilities for boys and home economics laboratories for girls – all managed by personnel drawing salaries considerably higher than those paid other municipal employees.

Now, this outlay of public funds is being made at a time when most city governments are strapped for money. Communities everywhere need to raise salaries for policemen and firemen; they are looking for funds to finance aid for the helpless and the destitute, to erase slums, to build and maintain streets and sewers and provide a variety of health, sanitation and planning services. Underpaid policemen, firemen and city hall janitors as well as poorly-serviced citizens are subsidizing the schools through personal deprivation as well as through local taxes. It is ironic that the high school graduate who goes to work for his community as a policeman or a laborer or clerk may have enjoyed plush facilities during school days, but faces the prospect of paying for these years of municipally-financed affluence by a lifetime of below-average living standards.

Yet even with the present substantial expenditures for schools, professional educators continue to release a barrage of statements informing us that more money is urgently needed. Miss Clarice Kline, President of the National Education Association, for example, in the *NEA Journal* for September, 1960, wrote that one purpose of her organization during the coming year would be to promote "... the ultimate acceptance of governmental responsibility at all levels for more adequate school finance. . . ." *The Municipal Yearbook for 1960* makes the following matter-of-fact statement about school finances: "... A review of the decade of the 1950's showed that state financial contributions to education increased at an annual rate of 13 percent across the nation. Urban and suburban school districts found the local property tax less and less equal to the task of providing funds for school operation. Proposals for improvement included suggestions that other taxes be authorized for local school districts and that assessment ratios be reviewed in the interest of increasing revenue and reducing inequities."

The time has come, it seems to me, to think very hard about the relationship, if any, between more money and more learning. For 13 years I have taught in college classrooms the graduates of secondary schools in a dozen or more Midwestern states. I cannot, on the basis of that evidence, believe we are getting our money's worth. The high schools from which they

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come are not dedicated to education in any culturally acceptable meaning of the word. Specifically, the modern high school graduate has little or no knowledge of the realities, accomplishments or excellences of the past. The disciplines of the arts and sciences and the satisfaction of these disciplines are not known, not respected, and consequently not imitated. The graduate exhibits only the vaguest awareness of the identity of Job, Emerson, Disraeli, Woodrow Wilson, Saint Augustine, Conrad, Pasteur, Locke or Mozart. He is totally ignorant of the existence of men like Ben Jonson, Vivaldi, John Stuart Mill, Zola or Henry Wallace.

If his intellectual performance or his careless judgments on complex questions are challenged, the student is fond of observing that "one opinion is as good as another," or "everyone is entitled to his own opinion." And these responses are uttered with no particular arrogance; rather, they are pleasantly said as though they were universally accepted truths.

In order to understand the type of training that produces such an attitude it is necessary to know that during high school years these boys and girls were under constant pressure to "take part" in things. They were encouraged to have a hobby, join one or more clubs, "go out for" cheerleading, dramatics, debate, football, band, baseball, student government, chess, basketball and other "activities." Their social position in the high school was largely dependent on the number of activities they engaged in, and they were taught both formally and informally that social position is of the greatest importance. So rushed and busy were these students that they had no opportunity to explore with patience and care the treasury of human accomplishments, gaining thereby a bit of insight into the imagination of a medieval architect, or the way a scientist works, or the canny knack of designers who create within the limitations of their various media.

Accounts of their school years indicate that in the high school graduates' hierarchy of values "activities" come first. They relate with enthusiasm stories of classes dismissed for "pep" assemblies, rallies, Friday afternoon games, regional and state tournaments in two or three different sports. "I lived from one Friday to another during football season," wrote a former cheerleader in one of my classes. These young people were accustomed to being excused from classes for Mothers' Teas, class meetings, PTA programs, class dances, assemblies, debates, skits, money drives, play practices and conferences. When they come to college they often explain their ignorance of basic English or American history or elementary mathematics with the statement, "I was so busy in high school I really didn't have any time to study."

If we look at what schools spend for books, we get a clearer picture. *The Encyclopedia of Educational Research for 1960* lists the average per-pupil expenditure for books and pamphlets in elementary and secondary school libraries in 1953-54 (the last year for which figures are now available) as 74 cents. According to the encyclopedia, this figure "... may be compared with an expenditure of 46 cents per pupil in 1941-42 for books and pamphlets. This represents an actual decrease of 5 cents in expenditure for this time when the 1941-42 figure is adjusted for changes in purchasing power." Now let us move to the playing field. The same encyclopedia says, "The average annual per-pupil cost for physical education (1958) was $11.85 ..."

The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare lists library expenses for school systems in 1955-56 as the lowest specified expenditure; transportation costs for school children alone in this listing are almost four times greater than that for libraries.

The question I raise here is not whether we should or should not vote more money for libraries. It is whether we have our priorities right. At present it is the "doing activities" that call for and get both the students' time and the taxpayers money; and unless we are more careful in the future, larger school appropriations may result in nothing more than further distraction from the primary task of learning.

It is not only that the modern high school graduate is ignorant of and indifferent to the past; he is disinclined to question anything in the existing order. Like the

THE KENNEDY PROGRAM

In setting as "our twin goals ... a new standard of excellence in education – and the availability of such excellence to all who are willing and able to pursue it," the President proposed last week a $5.625 billion program of federal aid with three key provisions:

For public elementary and secondary school construction and teachers' salaries, he recommended federal grants of $2.298 billion spread over three years. The objective would be a minimum expenditure of $15 "for every public school student in average daily attendance." It would be up to the states to determine whether to use the grants for school buildings or teachers' salaries or both.

For 212,500 college scholarships, he urged grants of $577.525 million over a five-year period to the states, which would choose recipients according to ability and need. Stipends would average $700 each but would range up to $1,000, and colleges would get a $350 "allowance" for each recipient enrolled.

For the construction of college classrooms, laboratories and libraries, he proposed extension of the existing college housing loan program for five years at a $250 million per year level and the establishment of another five-year low-interest loan program of $300 million per year for college facilities.

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woman who opposed daylight saving time because "God made time the way it is and if He had wanted it different He would have made it that way," the student is shocked at the idea of critical examination.

Yet the American tradition has been one of vigorous and sometimes even violent public disagreement. From Jefferson and Hamilton, Lincoln and Douglas, right up through Thoreau, Melville, the IWWs, Father Coughlin and Barry Goldwater, our people have used their legacy of free speech to question the most fundamental assumptions. But the modern graduate, with what nearly amounts to religious faith, believes in *Time* magazine and the *Reader's Digest* (both publications are often used as supplementary texts in secondary school classes), the absolute value of material comfort, the United Nations, private enterprise, the benevolent infallibility of the police department and the FBI, the importance and reliability of advertising and advertisements, the universal need to "get along with people," world brotherhood, baseball, the cultivation of a "well-rounded personality," and something called "modern science," a term usually meaning improved methods of electrically opening cans or forecasting the weather. He is totally unaware, for example, that *The New Republic* and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., may find *Time* magazine's simplifications misleading; he does not know that Paul Gallico, after years devoted to sports writing, can reject professional baseball as a business cleverly sold to the American public; he does not know that honorable Canadian and British leaders advocate socialistic experiments and still retain their honor; he does not know that there are many people in this nation and world who would be most undesirable brothers in any brotherhood movement.

Budgets and Values

It would be ridiculous, of course, to say that the high school has a responsibility to train all young people to be dissenters. The trouble is that it shields them from any contact with dissent. When challenged, they are at a loss to explain their beliefs. The only general exception to their ignorance of dissent is their familiarity with "beatniks," and this is generally restricted to derisive stories about "beatnik" radicalism. They are as ignorant of beatnik literature as they are of *Common Sense*, *The American Crisis* and other literature of our own Revolution.

One cannot but wonder if the abundance of cash annually poured into school systems may not contribute substantially to educationalists' reluctance to training minds that one day might come to question the absolute importance of expanded budgets and unqualified material values. *Walden*, for example, might seem a dangerous anachronism when taught between a "pep" assembly and a social science class in an antiseptic classroom complete with window darkening apparatus to allow for convenient motion picture projection and a loudspeaker system regularly used in October to relay the World Series.

Not long ago I talked with a college freshman who graduated last year from a prosperous Midwestern high school. The school is an ultra-modern building located in what is known as the best part of town. It has one or two state championship athletic teams and a very fine marching band. With pride, this graduate said that his graduating class wanted to do something to make their school a better place for students who came after them; it owed something to the school in appreciation for what he called "the happiest years of our lives." After discussing the matter with the teacher who was senior class advisor, the class voted unanimously to give what was most needed – a whirlpool bath for the athletic department.

I know it is argued that the taxpayers are getting the quality of elementary and secondary education they *want*. Educational theorists and administrators, when confronted with the intellectual deficiencies in the high school product, point out that citizens expect the schools to provide an abundance of distracting "activities," that communities look on their schools as a sort of colorful showplace providing a variety of pageant-like activities for the purpose of community entertainment, and that civic leaders are much more interested in the success of their basketball team than in developing the "questioning mind." It is for these, they say, that communities invest so heavily in school budgets.

But is it not possible to assume that taxpayers support the present superficial substitute for learning because they are unaware of alternatives? Deluged with optimistic and promising propaganda from professional educators and educational organizations, how much do citizens know what goes on in the schools? School boards, PTA groups, civic organizations and private citizens that have so long interested themselves chiefly in problems of finance and appropriations should take a long, critical look at what they are buying. Why could not such groups set up committees to evaluate performance? They would find ready assistance from faculty members at nearby universities.

If citizens' groups were to interest themselves actively in the quality of education they are subsidizing, school administrators would be quick to react. There is an urgent need to inform school officials that we are deeply concerned with education as the fundamental discipline of the mind, and that the warm community feeling generated by basketball victories, mothers' teas, glamorous proms, and good "school spirit" are expensive luxuries that we cannot continue to afford as the budget bites deeper and deeper into the community tax dollar. The idea that more learning comes from the appropriation of more money cannot continue forever.

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THE DEBATE ON NUCLEAR PACIFISM

Bertrand Russell on "Unilateralism"

The article on "Nuclear Pacifism" by Mr. Robert W Tucker in *The New Republic* of February 6 calls for a reply on some points. The policy of British Unilateralists is very widely misunderstood, not only in America, but also by its opponents in Britain. Our case is one which proceeds on what may be called conventional political lines and does not depend for its strength upon what are, somewhat misleadingly, called "moral" arguments. In fact, the strength of our case is conceded in Mr. Herman Kahn's big book *On Thermonuclear War* (*e.g.*, p. 179 and p. 235). Roughly, the case is as follows:

British membership in NATO and American nuclear weapons on British soil or in British waters offer Russia an incentive for an attack on Britain alone. Such an attack could wipe out the whole population of Britain in, at most, an hour. Mr. Kahn argues (to my mind, conclusively) that, in spite of obligations under NATO, America would not respond by a full-scale nuclear attack upon Russia. Indeed, it is difficult to see what valid argument America could have for doing so. The British would be all corpses, and could no longer be helped. The only effect of American intervention would be to turn the rest of the world into corpses. It follows that the protection which Western Europe is supposed to derive from NATO is illusory. While Britain remains in NATO and gives hospitality to American nuclear weapons, Russia has a motive for destroying Britain. If Britain were neutral and destitute of American nuclear weapons, Russia would have no greater motive for attacking Britain than for attacking India or any other neutral. It follows that the existence of nuclear weapons on British soil exposes Britain to greater danger than a policy of non-nuclear neutrality.

While the missile gap existed, America had a powerful reason for desiring launching sites in Western Europe. But the missile gap, if not already non-existent, is on the point of becoming so, and will certainly have become so before British unilateralism becomes government policy. As soon as the missile gap is closed, America ceases to have the same need for launching sites in Western Europe. On the contrary, the obligation under NATO to protect Western Europe is onerous and may entail a situation in which disaster to the United States can only be avoided by what will appear as a breach of faith. For this reason, British unilateralism is in the interests of America as well as of Britain. So far, I am still in agreement with Mr. Kahn.

But all this offers no solution to world problems. It leaves Russia and America facing each other still with a stock of nuclear weapons and still able to destroy the human race whenever some fanatic in a key position thinks fit to do so or when some accident is misinterpreted as a hostile attack. British Unilateralists, therefore, have to admit that British neutrality would be only a step, and perhaps rather a small step, toward the prevention of a general nuclear war. As to what further steps should be taken, I can speak only for myself, not for the general body of British Unilateralists.

Personally, I should not advocate American unilateral disarmament because I think that, if America and Russia alone were concerned, it would not be difficult to reach a disarmament agreement. The difficulty in all negotiations since 1945 has been that East and West each came to conferences with complete schemes and each felt that motives of prestige forbade any accommodation to the schemes of the other side. If disarmament agreements are to be reached, a new method will be necessary. A neutral Britain, in combination with other politically mature neutrals, could draw up a comprehensive draft treaty between Russia and America which should aim at giving no net advantage to either side. Such a draft treaty could be accepted by both sides without loss of face. It would no longer be necessary, as hitherto, for a disarmament conference to begin with a head-on collision between suspicious rivals. It could begin, instead, with a neutral advocacy of a scheme which there would be no reason to suspect of containing traps for the unwary. One of the reasons for wishing Britain to be neutral is that it would make possible British participation, and perhaps leadership, in such negotiations initiated by neutrals.

It must always be remembered that the supreme danger is a general nuclear war. It seems that the Soviet Government has now realized this fact, and has even been prepared to quarrel with China in advocating a policy of pacification. It is customary in the West to suppose that any sensible statement by the Soviet Government must be insincere. I do not think that this can be believed by anyone who takes the trouble to study the facts. Khrushchev has proclaimed with all the vigor of which he is capable (and that is saying much) that, if the West will accept a disarmament agreement, the Soviet Government will agree to any amount of inspection to make sure that the terms are carried out. I read, lately, an article by Major General Talenski

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called "The Character of Modern War." This article was first published in Moscow, but was printed in English in *Survival*, the journal of the Institute for Strategic Studies, for January-February, 1961. The whole tone of the article makes it obvious that it is addressed to Russian public opinion. After setting forth the vast destruction to be expected in a nuclear war, he concludes: "War in a military-technical sense has outlived itself as a weapon of policy." Unlike American military authorities, he is urgently in favor of nuclear disarmament. In this, he is only expressing what is now Soviet orthodoxy. Khrushchev has risked his whole career and probably his very life in the endeavor to persuade the Communist world, including China, that war is not inevitable and can and must be avoided. I wish that some equally powerful voice in the West were proclaiming the same doctrine. But when Khrushchev comes before a disarmament congress with a proposal for disarmament, the West is indignant and replies. "Surely you must know by this time that disarmament is *not* one of the purposes of a disarmament conference." It is a tragic fact that in Khrushchev's fight with the Communists who think war is inevitable, the West has done everything in its power to give the victory to his opponents. What the West ought to have done was to assume his complete sincerity and proceed to negotiations on that basis. If there were any insincerity on his side, such negotiations would soon reveal it.

There is one matter as to which Mr. Tucker's article does me something less than justice. Some years ago Mr. Joseph Alsop, I think with a view to discrediting me, had an interview with me in which he stressed almost exclusively my opinion that a Communist world would be better than no world. Sidney Hook took this up and argued vehemently against me. Mr. Tucker says, "Lord Russell insisted on posing the problem in just these terms" – *i.e.*, in the terms, "would a Communist world be better than no world." It was not I who insisted on these terms. It was Mr. Alsop and Dr. Hook. And when I pointed out to Dr. Hook that the question was somewhat unreal, since freedom for the Western world can almost certainly be preserved without war, he headed his reply, "Lord Russell retreats," whereas, in fact, I have not retreated a single inch. He also assumed that what I said was only addressed to the West, whereas I was equally saying to fanatical Communists that a completely capitalist world would be better than no world. I hold both parts of this view, but I do not hold that such a choice need ever be necessary.

I do think, however, that it is unfortunate in the highest degree that the opposite view should be widely held in America, since it undoubtedly increases enormously the likelihood of a nuclear war. Those who hold such a view will be inclined to hold also that negotiations with the Communist bloc must be broken off if any concession, however slight, had to be made to what the Communists demand. Negotiation, if it is to be successful, must be a matter of give and take. It cannot proceed on the assumption that one side is wholly right and the other wholly wrong. Negotiation, sooner or later, is inevitable if the human race is to continue. Mr. Kahn, in a very optimistic discussion of the results of a nuclear war, concedes that, after such a war, "life is going to be stark, elemental, brutal, filthy and miserable." He also agrees that, during and after such a war, America will be obliged to establish a system of rigid socialism indistinguishable from the system which we should have been fighting to destroy. He thinks that, if the American Government is very wise, there *may* be enough Americans and enough Russians left at the end of the war to make recovery possible. One is left to suppose that, after the necessary minimum of recovery, each side will prepare for another war for, if such a war is to be prevented by negotiation, the negotiation might as well occur now. But he gives no hint that this is possible at the present time.

I should like to end with a few words about pacifism. I have never, myself, been a complete pacifist; I favored the Second World War, but not the First, and I have seen no reason to think that, in either case, I was mistaken. But modern weapons of mass destruction have introduced a new element. Whatever may be the purposes of a war, they will not now be achieved. Both East and West can give the world more of what they respectively consider desirable if they achieve peaceful coexistence than if they indulge in nuclear war. This is completely obvious to every candid mind. Only fanaticism and national pride prevent it from being generally recognized. Catholics and Protestants, in the course of 130 years, learned to tolerate each other's existence. Communists and anti-Communists have to learn the lesson of mutual tolerance more quickly, because wars have become more destructive. We can all live or all die. No other choice is possible. East and West, alike have to learn this lesson. One must hope they will learn it before it is too late.

COMING

William Lee Miller on

The Future of Mankind

by Karl Jaspers

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. . . And a Reply by Robert W. Tucker

In considering the case for nuclear pacifism I did not deal in my *New Republic* article with the specific policy arguments of the British Unilateralists, which presumably apply only, or primarily, to Britain. Lord Russell's remarks nevertheless call for comment.

I agree that the presence of American strategic forces on British soil or in British waters furnish the Soviet Union with a compelling reason to attack Britain *in the event of general nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.* It is not at all clear, however, why the presence of these forces in Britain should provide Russia with an incentive to attack Britain *alone,* as Lord Russell contends. Short of a direct nuclear attack on this nation, no other possible action by the Soviets would be as provocative to America and as hazardous to the Soviet Union. What possible interest would the Soviets have in undertaking such an attack on Britain alone? They would not thereby destroy the principal threat to their existence, *i.e.,* the American strategic forces based on this continent and at sea. Whatever Lord Russell may believe America would do or would not do in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on Britain, it is safe to assume that Soviet planners do not share his assurance – and with good reason. And it is hardly necessary that the Soviets destroy Britain in order to render NATO impotent. More subtle and less risky methods are available to them for achieving this purpose.

Nor does the conclusion follow "that the protection which Western Europe is supposed to derive from NATO is illusory." What does follow from the developments Lord Russell notes is that the presence of American nuclear missile forces in Western Europe represents an increasing liability to the Western Europeans and that a strategy heavily reliant upon deterring aggression by threatening nuclear retaliation is becoming less and less credible. But to say that a strategy of deterrence has become less credible is not to say that it is no longer credible at all. Given the consequences of nuclear war, there is a very considerable difference between a probability – even a strong probability – and a certainty that a threat of nuclear reprisal would not be carried out. I suspect many British Unilateralists appreciate this difference, which in part accounts for their reluctance to urge that America as well as Britain undertake unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Lord Russell readily admits that unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain as well as the adoption of a neutral policy would still leave the problem of averting a general nuclear conflict. But he believes that British neutrality would mean a step toward the solution of this problem. A neutral Britain together with other "politically mature" neutrals could draw up a comprehensive draft of a disarmament treaty. Such a draft treaty, he asserts, would not raise questions of prestige since it would be presented by disinterested third parties. Presumably for the same reason it would not be suspected of giving a net advantage to either side or of containing traps for the unwary.

Although Lord Russell is fond of pointing to the excessive national pride of others, there is more than a bit of national pride in his suggestion that Britain might perhaps assume leadership of such a scheme. This is understandable. What is difficult to understand is his optimism. Why is it that so simple a plan has not already been attempted with success? Surely not because there have been no politically mature neutrals ready and willing to assume the role Lord Russell would assign to Britain. And why would there be no reason to suspect a disarmament proposal put forth by neutrals of containing traps for the unwary? Whether a disarmament plan would give a net advantage to one side or contain traps for the unwary cannot be determined simply by the disinterested motives of those who draw it up. The most disinterested of motives might still result in a plan that would give a net advantage to one side and thereby create a situation having even less stability than we presently possess. The motives of those who draw up a disarmament plan are no doubt important, but it is the nature of the plan itself and its effects upon the interests of the principals involved that must prove decisive.

Lord Russell thinks that the technical problems involved in reaching a disarmament agreement are not very difficult. Why then have we made so little progress in disarmament? At one point Lord Russell insists that "motives of prestige" and fear of "loss of face" have inhibited agreement. Apparently, however, he does not himself really believe so manifestly inadequate an explanation. What he does mean to believe is that until very recently both sides have been so intent on insuring the ultimate triumph of their respective systems and beliefs that neither has been willing to take disarmament seriously. Each side has been willing to continue to run the risk of nuclear war rather than to make any substantial concessions to the other side.

There is much to be said for this interpretation of past failures in disarmament negotiations. We did not take the problems of arms control and disarmament very seriously because of our complacent assumption of continued superiority in the new weaponry. Given this assumption, a strong incentive was lacking to take

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risks or to make concessions in order to achieve a disarmament agreement, particularly as long as those conflicts of interest that had brought on the Cold War remained unresolved.

If the conflicts of interest that gave rise to the Cold War nevertheless persist, the assumption of American superiority has surely disappeared. What is more, the hazards involved in continuing the arms race have become increasingly apparent. As a consequence, there has been a considerable shift in the climate of American opinion within the past two years, and it appears altogether likely that this change is still only in its initial stage. Even so, whereas two years ago the argument that risks would have to be taken and concessions made in order to make any progress on arms control and disarmament was considered quite heretical, this argument has now become almost a commonplace.

Lord Russell does not acknowledge, however, that there has been any change in the American attitude. He can only find a change in the attitude and policy of the Soviet Government. The Soviets, he observes, now seem to realize "that the supreme danger is a general nuclear war" and this presumably accounts for Khrushchev's insistence that "if the West will accept a disarmament agreement, the Soviet Government will agree to any amount of inspection to make sure that the terms are carried out." But the West will not acknowledge the supreme danger of nuclear war, endorse even in principle the goal of general disarmament, or proclaim the doctrine "that war is not inevitable and can and must be avoided."

All this is nonsense. If Lord Russell is going to accept Soviet declarations at face value he might do the same with respect to the West. The danger of nuclear war was being proclaimed in the West well before Khrushchev's recent pronouncements. The doctrine that war is not inevitable and can and must be avoided has been repeated on so many occasions by American statesmen that it is now almost in danger of being ignored as too self-evident to warrant discussion. And contrary to the curious impression Lord Russell shares with many others, this nation has endorsed the principle of general disarmament. It did so, for example, at the last session of the UN General Assembly.

It is another matter to argue that the West has often been inept in responding to Soviet proposals for disarmament. No particular advantage is gained, and a great deal may possibly be lost, by refusing to take Soviet proposals seriously or by immediately questioning the sincerity of the source. At the same time, it is much too simple to say – as does Lord Russell – that if there is any insincerity in a Soviet proposal, negotiation would soon reveal it. In the endeavor to influence world opinion, a natural advantage accrues to the side which responds to men's fears and hopes with all-inclusive formulas for salvation. Those who react to such formulas by insisting on negotiating step-by-step agreements and who are preoccupied – perhaps occasionally too preoccupied – with the safeguards that must accompany each step are easily characterized as recalcitrant and readily placed in the position of dragging their feet. Men have always been able to believe what they have wanted to believe, no matter how implausible their belief. Confronted with the terrible danger of nuclear conflict, it is not surprising that many are able to persuade themselves that disarmament is after all a relatively easy matter given only the desire to disarm, that Mr. Khrushchev is quite ingenuous in his proposal for immediate and complete disarmament, and that he means what he says when promising to agree to any amount of inspection in order to insure its effectiveness. Whoever interferes with this persuasion must bear the onus of wishing to continue the arms race with all of its hazards and of being morally indifferent to the most elementary requirements of human survival. The Soviets are aware of the intensity of this persuasion and one must concede their ability in making the most of it.

The implication emerges from Lord Russell's remarks that America remains opposed to serious disarmament negotiations because of a fear that the outcome might diminish the prospect of a "capitalist world." It is bad enough to believe that a Communist world would be worse than no world. It is even worse that we are as a nation sufficiently fanatic in our intent to establish a "capitalist world" that we are quite willing to run the risk of nuclear war in order to achieve this goal. The logic of this argument is that disarmament negotiations if they are to succeed require both sides to make concessions, but that we are unwilling to make any for fear of jeopardizing our ultimate goal. If this were true, we would not only be very misanthropic but quite stupid. It is one thing to point to the intensity of the American desire to build what has been called – perhaps somewhat euphemistically – a "compatible world." It is quite another to insist that we consider nuclear weapons an indispensable instrument for achieving such a world. Even a decade ago, in far different circumstances, this argument was only partially true. Today, it is false. Whatever our illusions, the idea that nuclear weapons may somehow be used to resolve the Cold War in our favor is not one of them.

One last point. I did not say that Lord Russell has insisted on posing the nuclear dilemma in the terms "would a Communist world be better than no world." What I did say is that he has insisted upon posing the problem only in terms of destroying all life and thereby of putting an end to history. He does precisely this in his reply to my article, for he concludes by declaring: "We can all live or all die. No other choice is possible." If I have misrepresented his true position it has not been entirely my fault.

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Up the Road to Materialism

by Ronald Sanders

Considering the prominent role of immigration in its history, America has produced remarkably few good novels on the subject. This is especially true of the so-called "new immigration," which began with the rapid growth of American industry after the Civil War, and was made up primarily of laborers from Southern and Eastern Europe, who came to find work in the cities. Occasionally a native American writer could show a fine understanding of their lot, as Upton Sinclair did in his study of Lithuanian immigrants in *The Jungle*, but even so fine a work as this is limited by its being the viewpoint of an outsider. Rarely did one of the "new" immigrants write a novel about his own experiences; and with good reason – few of them had the time, or the background, or sufficient grasp of the English language.

The Rise of David Levinsky
by Abraham Cahan
Introduction by John Higham
(Harper Torchbooks; $2.45)

One admirable exception to this was Abraham Cahan, an intellectual educated in Russia, who arrived in America in 1882 at the age of 22, at the very moment the first great westward migration of Jews from the Russian Empire was beginning. As a socialist, he soon became one of the organizers of the Yiddish-speaking workers of New York into an autonomous branch of the American labor movement. He became uniquely qualified to write both *to* the Jewish immigrant and about him. Ultimately he gave all of his time to Yiddish journalism, in which, as co-founder and editor of *The Jewish Daily Forward*, he created the largest-selling and most interesting Yiddish-language newspaper in the world, but he was an English-language novelist for a time, and good enough to draw the praise of William Dean Howells.

Yet, for all this background, *The Rise of David Levinsky*, Cahan's classic novel about a Jewish immigrant, was written virtually by accident. By 1912, Cahan, then 52, had not published a novel in seven years. But an injury suffered that year forced him away from his editor's office long enough to write his last novel. Out of the mishap came his best piece of work.

In one sense, *The Rise of David Levinsky* is simply a classic American success story. A poor Jewish immigrant from Russia works his way up in the garment industry in New York, and becomes a millionaire. The story is told to a rich background of scenes from Jewish life, from the little village in the old country, to New York's Lower East Side. But the novel becomes something more by dint of a tragic element in Levinsky's destiny. The hero wants a wife even more than he wants his fortune, yet he consistently fails in his desperately romantic adventures, and reaches middle age as a rich but lonely bachelor. This loss takes on a spiritual meaning, because Levinsky has associated his vision of ideal love with an equally idealized past, from which he has become entirely alienated, and which he hopes to recapture through a true marriage.

To the extent that the tale of the rich Levinsky, longing painfully for the irrecoverable innocence of his boyhood, is a tragic one, Cahan reveals how much of an artist he was, in spite of his renunciation of fiction as a career. But Cahan was also very much a moralist. His life's work is marked by the conflict in him between artist and moralist, between the dreamer and the man of action. For the most part, he remained inexorably crusading as an editorialist, while the doubts and disappointments of the visionary let loose in this harsh world were consigned to his relatively youthful novels. (Cahan lived to the age of 91.) But there is a strong didactic element in his fiction nevertheless, as if he would not let this part of himself be excluded at any time, and it is evident in *The Rise of David Levinsky*.

Since Cahan was still a Socialist in 1912, it is Socialism that is held up as the alternative to Levinsky's spirtually unhappy way of life. Levinsky becomes a businessman when, one day, while still a humble employee, he gets into an argument with his boss. In a fit of anger, he withdraws from the bank all of the money he had been saving for a college education, and uses it to start a business of his own. Telling his own story, Levinsky points out ironically that he was at this moment in a "socialist mood" of protest against mistreatment at the hands of his employers. "Had I then chanced to hear a Socialist speech," he writes, "I might have become an ardent follower of Karl Marx and my life might have been directed along lines other than those which brought me to financial power." This is the turning point in Levinsky's life. Why a young man of Levinsky's intellectual leanings did *not* happen to hear a socialist speech on the Lower East Side of the turn of the century is something of a mystery.

In any case, Levinsky blindly tramples upon his own spiritual inclinations, and is led to face the ironies of this choice for the rest of his life. His last thwarted love affair (he is already a wealthy man in his forties), is with a girl who is the daughter of a Hebrew poet, and who, along with her brothers and sisters, is involved in various radical and socialist activities. She renounces Levinsky in favor of a young high school teacher. Still later, Levinsky meets the woman who had been the first love of his life, back in Russia, and she, too, is now a Socialist, who scorns him for his selfish and

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opulent career. In every case, socialism appears as the broken link with his irrecoverable past, the one thing that might have restored his soul after the decline of the piety of his boyhood.

But if Cahan is expressing a personal philosophy here (as he very much seems to be), one might question whether he really found salvation for himself to be so uncomplicated. He was not able to remain a Socialist all of his life. Following the logic of his own practical inclinations, he and the *Forward* renounced the Socialist Party in 1936, and supported the New Deal. In so doing, he was largely reflecting the trend of reformist socialism in Western Europe and America, and was, at the same time, being perfectly honest with his instincts. But, for all of the genuinely inspiring aspects of American pragmatic liberalism, it cannot evoke the kind of high religious passion that Cahan invoked in some of his early, rhapsodic writings on the Russian revolutionary movement before 1917. Max Weber has observed that attempting to save the soul through politics is a hazardous business; the Abraham Cahan of the 1930's would have agreed with him.

Perhaps Cahan felt quite differently in 1912, but even then, his attempts to flog David Levinsky with socialist possibilities are among the weakest parts of the book. Is it true that socialists have more simple, human love for one another than business people do? And why does a selfish girl, who goads the pious young Levinsky into forsaking his religious ways, and is therefore partially responsible for everything that he subsequently becomes, turn up in her middle age as a Socialist, to view her former lover with contempt? Cahan is excessively spiteful to his beleaguered hero.

Fortunately, a deeper significance in Levinsky's plight emerges. From the very outset, there are signs that the source of the trouble is America itself, or rather, the uprooting that America represents, undertaken for the sake of a more glorious-seeming future, but at the expense of whatever is beautiful about the past. "You should have stayed at home and stuck to your holy books," Levinsky is told by a prostitute whom he visits shortly after his arrival in America, when he is still a poor man. Even the old Hebrew poet whose children have found spiritual fulfillment in socialism, is lost in America, for all the purity of his life. He sees his new country as "a prison for the soul."

In this way, Cahan poses what has perhaps been the fundamental spiritual problem for the immigrant in America, and to some extent for subsequent generations too, who are faced with the task of reconstructing a spiritual life in a society that was in some ways built too fast. There are, of course, specific Jewish qualities to Levinsky's exile – Cahan's novel is a profoundly Jewish one – but in realizing his hero's plight in the midst of a society that has been built by exiles, Cahan has given it a broadly American significance.

This is not a great novel by any means. The style is too turgid and heavy-handed – the English is quite competent, but still the work of a man not perfectly at home in the language; the drama is often too forced, and the book has, in many places, the air of a period piece. But it is good literature for all that, and deserves a prominent piece in the annals of American sociological fiction.

Our Spanish Embarrassment

by Charles Burton Marshall

I recall once hearing one of our armed service attachés in Madrid extolling the virtues of Spain under Franco to a group of visiting congressmen. Chief among its good qualities, he said fervently, was its appreciation of professional military officers. In that society, he added, the officer class really constituted a class, and that class received its due of authority and respect.

The Franco regime did begin in military action, and its grasp of the rulership grew out of the command of arms. So far it has not reversed the relationship by subordinating the command of arms to the title to rule – the core of legitimacy. So the military factory does indeed rank high.

Spain and Defense of the West: Ally or Liability
by Arthur P. Whitaker
(Harper; $6)

Yet it is only one – not the sole mainstay of the regime. The Roman Catholic hierarchy is counted in. So is a small, closed group of big men in commerce and finance. In his *Spain and Defense of the West*, Arthur P. Whitaker uses quotation marks in calling them an "oligarchy." He doubts their being powerful and unified enough to deserve the term. Fourth among the power groups is the Falange – a monopolistic political party exemplifying a wan sort of totalitarianism. All four are instruments as well as repositories of power. What really counts is the top man, Francisco Franco, in his fourfold role as chief of state, prime minister, generalissimo, and Caudillo, whose "clever coachmanship . . . has kept them pulling, however, reluctantly, under his reins, sometimes in double tandem, sometimes in relays." His talent for management has been helped by an idea "born of the terrible Civil War and its million dead . . . the fear that Franco's removal might bring about a repetition of the horrors of that ordeal."

What Franco operates, Whitaker emphasizes, is a dictatorship. The top man picks the Cabinet ministers. They are not accountable to any representative institution. The parliament, without authority, is dominated by the executive. The regime acts as judge in its own cause in all cases involving political offenses. It asserts control over all aspects of national life, unhampered by verbalizations, personal rights and immunities in the basic documents of government – a Charter of Rights which, in Salvador de Madariaga's phrase, "guarantees every right which the government tramples on daily."

The regime's main redeeming feature is that it does not operate very well. Whitaker describes it as a despotism mitigated by slovenliness. The concentration of authority peters out in a a bureaucracy which "preserves the

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spirit summed up in the time-honored phrase, 'I obey, but I do not execute,' and . . . also at least the usual quota of human and particularly bureaucratic frailties. Favoritism is so common that the regime has been described as government by *enchufe*, meaning connection, pull, influence. Sterner critics describe it as a tyranny tempered by corruption."

Whitaker's book, written under auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, focuses on the relationship between the United States and Spain beginning in July of 1951, when Admiral Forrest Sherman, then Chief of Naval Operations, "went to Spain on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an exploratory discussion of the question of bases with General Franco." This set in train negotiations which culminated in a Pact of Madrid of September 26, 1953 – a set of agreements covering defense, defense assistance, and economic aid. Though not juridically a treaty, the instrument nevertheless signed Spain and the United States as allies devoted to "free institutions and individual liberties."

The arrangement with Spain began as a matter of military convenience. It grew into something economic as well. The trouble is, however, that reality scarcely conforms to the categories of policy, and arrangements which start out to be narrow and technical have a way of spreading out to be broad and political. What began as a cool relationship of limited mutual advantage finally led President Eisenhower to Madrid in 1959, where he said something in praise of "freedom in justice" and then traded hugs with Franco.

Whitaker sees some limited advantages to us in the military arrangements. "On the whole, the aid program has worked about as smoothly and successfully as could reasonably be expected," he says. Yet, he concludes, "after seven years of limited partnership the Madrid government remains quite unmoved by the weight of America's example, record and achievements, and by whatever persuasion these may have exerted." Franco's Spain has proved relatively impervious, and Whitaker thinks that "the United States should make clear its disappointment" and "revert to its cool and correct attitude . . . towards the Spanish dictator, in conformity with the attitude it has officially adopted in its dealings with Latin American dictators, fulfilling all that is required by international decorum." "There is, he adds, "no foundation in reason or history for the notion that allies must be bosom friends." He thinks we should get other governments of the Western bloc to share the political liability of treating with Franco, but urges abandonment of our idea of stretching NATO to accommodate Spain. What he suggests instead is another pact – a Western Mediterranean pact. Presumably – though he does not elaborate the idea – it too could have a secretariat, a few combined boards, a prolixity of staff committees, and a high council with meetings at least once a year.

Also he wishes our "effort at persuasion" would be "more consistent and comprehensive." I find this somewhat vague and question-begging. Spain has been around a long time and has been persistently Spanish, and will probably remain so. The main political frailty of Spaniards, as Ortega y Gasset once pointed out, is not an addiction to authoritarianism but a suspicion of all authority. As skeptics and individualists, they regard all government as a nuisance, failing to make the distinctions which men must make between bad government and government that is somewhat better. Failing to make that distinction, they get bad government. Franco and his dictatorship are a symptom rather than a cause of the enduring political frailty of Spain. What our government may say to its government is not likely to change matters much.

The Pecking Order in Housing

by Asher Brynes

We are familiar with the dynamics of American automobile ownership. Until quite recently Detroit has manufactured cars that were a bit bigger and a bit more expensive each year. Customers who had the means "exchanged" their slightly tarnished but otherwise quite unworn cars for new ones of the same make. More rarely they traded up to a higher-priced machine. Back of the automobile dealer's establishment or to one side of it there was and still is his used car lot, where lower-income purchasers are offered a wide choice of the appropriately marked down vehicles discarded by the higher-income group in good, practical running order.

Housing and Economic Progress
by Lloyd Rodwin
(Harvard; $7.50)

Mr. Rodwin does not mention the automobile problem in this fascinating study but his view of housing, particularly the future of it, has many parallels. Middle-income families, he says, are "transitionals," that is, as they improve their circumstances they rent or buy new housing. "They are in the twilight zone between renting and ownership, and between the families who need no assistance and those who require very special assistance. They . . . live in or are leaving the 'gray' areas, the miles of dingy neighborhoods meeting minimum standards, but not sufficiently adequate or attractive for their residents as standards rise. The housing abandoned by these middle-income families can serve many low-income families as their income rises; and the new homes for these (middle-income) families need not be built to minimum standards subject to the premature obsolescence which endangers most public housing as standards rise."

The rich have no problem of deciding between ownership and rental of their living quarters, and the poor have the decision made for them by their circumstances. They must pay as much as they can spare for decent living space. But tenure, or home ownership, is what the middle-income people of our time have wanted, and our economy has made it possible for them to have it. But home ownership has often imposed on them a heavy financial burden, with the consequence that their family savings have been

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squandered, their mobility unduly curbed, and job opportunities lost.

The solution of most state and Federal officials, who for obvious reasons must look to the needs of the low-income group too, is additional rental housing built to middle-income standards, so that the low-income group may have the reversion of it. However, it is an axiom among experts in the field that production of rental housing in a free market tends to be retarded, especially in time of war, when costs are inflated. Thus the relationship of rent control to new construction has become a critical issue. Mr. Rodwin concludes, on the basis of his close study of housing in Boston, that rent controls do not directly "force a much greater shift in the tenure of rental housing, or a dampening of new construction, or a much more uneconomical and inefficient use of housing resources." The causes of such phenomena are far more deep-seated. Changes of tenure are stimulated by the presence of a seller's market, and by expectations of higher income.

By concentrating his analysis on a single strategic area the author has contributed to the emergence of a solid *expertise* in the field of housing. He gives us hope to believe that in time the struggle between the enigmatic customer and the government expert, who longs for a comprehensive attack on all housing problems at once, may be resolved.

MOVIES

Naturalism on Celluloid

Sanctuary (20th Century-Fox)
Shadows (Lion International)

One couldn't flog a deader horse than the subject of how Hollywood alters plays and novels. Who would expect to see *Sanctuary* filmed as written? Anyway, tears would be a bit crocodilian because the book was a pot-boiler for Faulkner himself; he has said that it is simply "the most horrific tale I could imagine."

Still it is one of the most widely read pot-boilers a genius ever wrote, so perhaps it is useful to note the chief alterations in the current film (which is also based on *Requiem for a Nun*). Firstly – and let us all admit that it's our first question – no corn-cob. Cobs are visible only in the background of one brief scene as, I suppose, token obeisance to the improprieties. More: Popeye, whose impotence was an unsubtle but effective symbol, has been transformed into Candy, an aphrodisiac Cajun. Nancy Mannigoe, who makes an early appearance here in the bootleggers' hide-out, warns Temple that if she messes with Candy, he will soon have her on all fours howling like a dog, and, do you know, it comes true only about one reel later.

Also, Candy-Popeye is not hanged. He survives a flaming car-crash and turns up years later to threaten Temple's marriage. After Nancy murders Temple's baby, he disappears. (He isn't even given a scene in which to disappear; the role simply dribbles away.)

There are several other less important changes. Presumably to "tighten" the structure, Temple is made the governor's daughter, which puts her in the unlikely and unsavory position of detailing her sexual cravings to her own father. But the important changes are in Candy-Popeye. They transform an allegory of the effects of buried guilt and increasing self-knowledge into the chronicle of a long-smoldering romance which troubles Temple's marriage and which flares up again almost to wreck it.

Lee Remick is pallid compared with Joanne Woodward's performance in past films in what is virtually the same part: the domination-hungry, genteel-sluttish Southern patrician miss. Bradford Dillman (as her husband) is rapidly floating to the top of whatever depths he was once able to plumb; his acting has lost much of its resonance and is becoming tinny. Saddest of all is the evisceration of Yves Montand (Candy) who seems bereft of the power and presence he showed in several French films. Part of this is because Candy is written and directed in stale George Raft terms; but part of it may be due to Montand's insecurity in English. Foreign actors do not often attain genuine confidence with our language, and this affects their whole theatrical beings. Obviously many have played successfully in English but rarely as well as in their native tongues. Montand's language struggle is thinning his general substance as an actor. One indication of this is the way he over-affects ease. In his French films he took it for granted.

The only admirable performance is given, with mahogany strength and beauty, by a Negro actress and singer named Odetta, who plays Nancy.

Tony Richardson, who was one of the lights of the naturalistic British Free Cinema movement, has directed the film. His previous pictures seen here, *Look Back in Anger* and *The Entertainer*, had at least a naturalistic sheen and a certain ambition. Not *Sanctuary*. The direction is dull and riddled with clichés (such as pulling the camera back and up as the couple walk down the empty street at the end. The inclusion of Nancy in the shot doesn't redeem it.) Sometimes it is excruciatingly bad; throughout it is devoid of pictorial imagination and dramatic presentation.

Shadows, an American film directed by John Cassavetes, has a relation to the work of the British Free Cinema. The film was, as it were, shot free-hand – some of it out of focus and with levels of sound-recording that are often bizarre. All the settings are real New York streets, bars, apartments. As much as anything else, it attempts to bring its environment back alive. Thus it is an exercise in what Siegfried Kracauer calls "the redemption of physical reality." The theory is generally well demonstrated here: the world fixed on film with time figuratively stopped (which is the basic fascination of all photography), and truth as the sum of literal facts.

The story is about two Negro broth-

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ers and their sister; the brothers, who are musicians, are black and light tan, the pretty sister is light-skinned enough to "pass" for white. Their professional and personal frustrations, bitterness, and resolution are explored with varying effectiveness. Here again the main interest is in method. All the dialogue was improvised by the actors while the camera was in motion; only the story outline was pre-arranged.

Improvisation is becoming one of the more abused facets of acting theory, particularly by those who forget that Stanislavsky intended it only as an exercise in the preparation of roles. We are told that some of the excellent French film *Breathless* (*NR*, February 13) was improvised, but it was done under a much firmer scenario than *Shadows* and the dialogue was tested before filming. Also, improvisation intended for an audience calls for more than acting ability and the actors appearing in *Breathless* are keener than those we see in *Shadows*.

Yet much of the American film has a free, jazzy, immediate feeling, a sense of eavesdropping that is provocative. Part of its appeal lies in feeding our subconscious revulsion with the artificial prettiness of most film "pictures" (although there are some seemingly inserted close-ups even here). Most of it is in the adventure of a new dimension possible only to the film.

The dimension is limited, however. Experiment is very welcome in an art so young and already so commerce-ridden. Anyone who cares about films will be glad that *Shadows* was made and will hope that it stimulates other film-makers. But the logical end of cinematic "reality" is to poke a camera out the window and let it run for two hours; and the end of improvisation is conversation, not drama.

Stanley Kauffmann

THEATER

Off Broadway's Trials and Triumph

For over a decade now, the off Broadway movement has been the major source of nourishment for the devitalized American stage, but lately even its robust arteries are showing signs of hardening. Accompanying its heightened prestige – and only crustaceans like Jule Styne (who finds the minority theater anti-American and anti-religious!) will still deny its importance – has come a growing reluctance to take bold chances. For like all successful revolutions, off Broadway is turning into a conservative institution, developing along the way severe institutional problems. The rise in ticket prices and production costs, the employment of high salaried actors from the commercial stage, the burgeoning of new high-rent theaters, the marked increase in press-agentry and advertising – all these tokens, along with a general decline in the quality of off Broadway fare, suggest that powerful economic pressures are putting the squeeze on off Broadway's aesthetic freedom. Significantly, a counter-movement has already been organized in the cabarets (*off* off Broadway) where ambitious young groups operating on low budgets are trying to revivify the minority theater's flagging revolutionary ideals.

The King of the Dark Chamber
by Rabindranath Tagore
(Jan Hus House)

The erosion of these ideals has certainly been accelerated over the past two seasons. In the past, off Broadway devoted itself almost exclusively to three types of plays: (1) great works of the past, (2) important, neglected works of the modern theater, and (3) experimental works by avant-garde writers. Since all of these categories are usually shunned by the commercial stage, off Broadway was originally established as an alternative theater for serious works of art. To some extent, it still serves that function today, though with a good deal less ferocity and zeal. This season, for example, we have been able to see superior productions of works by Brecht, Pirandello, and Denis Johnston. On the other hand, many of the modern masters have been so mauled, mangled, and mishandled (Ibsen, Shaw, O'Casey, and – especially – Strindberg are the year's most conspicuous victims) that their revival seems a dubious advantage; and the classic drama, Shakespeare excepted, is now hardly ever played at all. What is worse, a growing proportion of off Broadway plays look like Broadway rejects. The accumulation of musicals in the minority theater is a depressing sign of commercial accommodation; and so is the emphasis on doubtful ex-Broadway commodities like *Camino Real, Clearing in the Woods, Montserrat,* and *Our Town*. As for new works, many of these now find their way into the minority theater not because they are too good for Broadway but because they are not good enough. I cite, as an illustration, *Call Me By My Rightful Name*, a "sensitive" hothouse problem play, studded with unnecessary violence, about a Negro and a white fingering each other's souls in their search for "love" and "communication." This one is not only impertinent to both races ("the soul," said D. H. Lawrence, "is a dark forest") but aesthetically trying as well, featuring a climax from the movie version of *Home of the Brave*, dialogue from the Late Late Show, and even an alternate (happy) ending in case some Broadway producer should decide to take an option.

By contrast, the current production of Rabindranath Tagore's *King of the Dark Chamber* more than compensates for off Broadway's recent failures, for it fulfills the highest function of the minority theater. This 20th Century Indian masterpiece, with its allegorical fairy-tale atmosphere and its highly charged poetic intensity, is a stunning theatrical work, stunningly interpreted by its director, Krishna Shah. Clearly

Notes on Contributors

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an inspired dramatic artist, Tagore manages to exploit all the various resources of the stage – music, mime, chorus, lyrical speech, song, declamation, gesture, makeup, costume – in a completely original manner. For in his hands, the conventions of Eastern theater are liberating devices rather than restrictions, freeing his imagination to an extent almost unequalled in modern Western tradition. Tagore's dramatic world is so multifarious that elements of broad farcical humor, sinister melodrama, and metaphysical soul-drama can jostle each other with no apparent friction; and his dramatic action is so multi-leveled that it becomes fairy tale, metaphor, and philosophy all at once. Tagore achieves dramatic unity primarily through the simplicity and directness of his vision. In his suggestive narrative of a Queen who gradually grows in love with a King so ugly his features cannot be exposed to the light, his characters have been totally stripped of their superficial adult sophistication to reveal instead a charming and child-like naïveté. It is this ceremony of innocence that Yeats (in his *Plays for Dancers*) and Brecht (in his *Caucasian Chalk Circle*) tried to restore to the Western theater as a necessary antidote to the cliches of an exhausted realism, for it was only by freeing the stage from sterile inhibitions that its limitless possibilities could be fully explored.

Krishna Shah's production manages to enhance the beauties of this work through a superb recreation of the techniques of Indian theater. The action is bursting with graceful mime and amusing horseplay; the stage is always gorgeously dressed, whether in movement or in repose; the work with the chorus (which acts as trees, lights, fire, and doors) is extraordinarily inventive; and the presentational style he has adopted is hypnotic, ceremonious, and stately. Astonishingly enough, he has achieved his effects with a predominantly American cast, though he has been aided immeasurably by the presence of an exquisite Indian actress, Surya Kumari, as the Queen. Watching Miss Kumari is not only a directly sensuous pleasure (her face has a kind of joyous limpidity which has long since faded from the features of American women) but a histrionic triumph as well; her performance is full of breathless, yearning, delicate grace. As for the Americans, they have managed to transcend their psychological conditioning to achieve a rather primitive middle style, halfway between rhetoric and sing-song, but it is a pleasant surprise to see them move so fluidly and, instead of shoving their hands in their costumes, manipulating them in the ritualistic gestures of the *mudras*. A complimentary word should be said for all of Shah's collaborators, but I would especially like to commend Bhsawar for his effectively conceived, and sinuously executed, dances: they are a welcome relief from the pseudo-folksy callisthenics of Western choreography. *The King of the Dark Chamber* exposes you to a rare and beautiful experience which works on your spine like long, cool, tapered fingers. It is with such works, infrequent as they have become, that off Broadway redeems its almost forgotten pledge.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

Correspondence

Averting the Final Catastrophe

Sirs:

No doubt we unilateralists appear to present a too simple answer to the Big Question. Robert W. Tucker thinks so ("Reflections on Nuclear Pacifism," February 6), and for this and other reasons decides that "the case for unilateral disarmament today is complicated and uncertain." Yet most of the fallacies he charges to unilateralists are present in his advocacy – let us say his apparent advocacy – of present policies. He disparages, *e. g.* the reliance of unilateralists on "what are presumed to be facts," which he then properly shows to be assumptions. But a few paragraphs later Mr. Tucker says it is "only reasonable to expect" that the Soviets would act virtually without restraint if the West should put down its arms. One man's assumption is another man's expectation.

While he is apparently sure that the Soviets would take over the West in event of unilateral disarmament by us, he rejects the annihilation thesis, and says that the real choice is to bump along for a decade or two – presumably with technology of war going at

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full throttle – while devising the means for *"averting the final catastrophe."* Mr. Tucker's thesis becomes unstitched in that last phrase. Nourished and guided by that military-scientific elite about which Eisenhower belatedly warned, the technology of war has a wide lead over the politics of peace.

Although Mr. Tucker just hopes that the world will somehow stumble through, he gives no grounds for confidence in our present policies as they stretch out into the future. Rejecting the somber Brown-Real vision, he gives us none in its place, and bids us only to cross our fingers.

Finally, Mr. Tucker is just plain wrong when he says that unilateralists depend on the "cataclysmic conclusion" of annihilation. There is no need to do so, for the prospects far short of annihilation are bad enough. A RAND spokesman told a Congressional Committee that a "moderate" attack would result in 60 million fatalities in the US alone. Suppose we make it a moderate "moderate" attack, and settle for half of that total. 30 million deaths is not annihilation, it is merely 30 times the total US casualties in the Civil War and the two World Wars. In order to make his warnings about the pacifist viewpoint really telling, Mr. Tucker has to demonstrate that such a war would surely result in the maintenance of American values; would not result in Soviet domination; and would be the last war, not merely a prelude to the Final War. That is the least that can be asked of a policy on which we are lavishing so much of our wealth and intellectual resources.

M. H. Ferry
Santa Barbara, California

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The Attorney General

Sirs:

May I say just a word in reply to my good friend Robert L. Randall, who takes me to task (February 20) as have some other friends, for writing in your January 9 issue that Robert F. Kennedy ought not to have been appointed Attorney General.

I have discovered no "absolute standards of qualification and fitness," and hence cannot oblige by disclosing any. Nevertheless, and I think not inconsistently, some grounds of disqualification did occur to me, and these I discussed at some little length. I do not yield to Mr. Randall in my unqualified admiration of the great majority of the other appointments that have been made in the Department of Justice, and I join in the belief that they augur well for the Attorney General's own performance in office. I do not agree that they provide the final answer to the questions I raised, or that they demonstrate that I should have waited before airing my concern.

Alexander M. Bickel
Yale Law School

The Effects of Mass Communication

Sirs:

Edward P. Morgan's review of Joseph Klapper's *The Effects of Mass Communication* (February 27) suggests that the book is deficient because "the boys on Madison Avenue will take it as an excuse . . . to continue their sins of loading the media with junk," and because "it is written in such a ponderously qualified way that it is not likely to inspire any of us . . . to move far upward from where we are now."

As a sociologist, I am very discouraged about Mr. Morgan's requirements for social science research. He seems to want it only if it provides findings – and inspiration – for his side, and if it is served up in easy-to-read black and white truths. In other words, Mr. Morgan wants Vance Packard sociology, the same "cheap, highly seasoned stew" which he (and the rest of us) want to remove from the mass media.

Mr. Klapper's book is a very careful and honest statement of generalizations about the short-range effects of the media. It is not a policy document,

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

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but it provides much food for policy thinking. For example, it suggests quite plainly that the liberal position has vastly overestimated the power of the spoken, written and televised word as a method of social change; and that the liberal program must be corrected to place more emphasis on other methods. . . . Consequently, more, and more thoughtful leadership is necessary, from Mr. Morgan and other broadcasters like him, from liberal organizations, and from the government.

Herbert J. Gans
Institute for Urban Studies
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Penna.

Brecht's Ambivalence

Sirs:

It is probably more legitimate to write to the Editor about a favorable, than about an unfavorable review. It is certainly more fun.

Both in my own person, and vicariously on behalf of the late Bertolt Brecht, I am most appreciative of Robert Brustein's essay-review (February 13) of the *Seven Plays*. I am writing to dissent on one point. While the main character of *A Man's a Man* gives up his identity, he does not do so as easily as Mr. Brustein implies, but is (so one critic has it) "brainwashed" with much cruelty. And Brecht, in my view, does believe he has an identity to give up. Any impression to the contrary should be attributed to a Swiftian irony – after all, Swift "believed" in killing all the babies.

There must, of course, be a reason why a good critic can miss this point (if I am right in assuming it to be there), and it is to be found in Brecht's ambivalence: he is writing a play to show how wicked society is to destroy your identity, yet at the same time he finds the destruction of identity an attractive proposition.

Mr. Brustein stated his view in good faith. But it is doubly worth taking issue with because it has often been stated in bad faith, as for instance in *The New Leader* recently where someone cited *A Man's a Man* as a misanthropic and otherwise subversive document.

Eric Bentley
Cambridge, Mass.

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